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Contracting for Stability: The Potential Use of Private
Military Contractors as a United Nations
Rapid-Reaction Force
Jared Genser and Clare Garvie∗

Abstract

In June 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations established by
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and chaired by former East Timor President José
Ramos-Horta, published its comprehensive review of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. The
Panel observed that it takes an average of six months from when a peacekeeping mission is
authorized by the U.N. Security Council to when the mission is deployed. The Panel further
explained that although rapid and effective deployment comes at a cost, responding more quickly
saves lives and can avoid a larger, more costly response later. In its request for the SecretaryGeneral to develop options for a new rapid-reaction capability, the Panel suggested evaluating
the merits of having a small, standing U.N. force, transferring personnel and assets from other
U.N. missions, and instituting national and regional standby arrangements. Each of these
options, however, has been available for years, relies heavily on the political will of countries and
regional organizations, and has not previously been sufficient to address the requirements of
rapid deployment to new missions or crisis situations.
This Article suggests that the U.N. also evaluate the potential use of private military
and security companies (PMSCs) to serve as a U.N. rapid-reaction force. In short, the U.N.
already relies heavily on PMSCs, it is legally permissible for PMSCs to be engaged in
peacekeeping operations, PMSCs are well trained and equipped, and the U.N. could contract
with PMSCs to hold a PMSC corporate entity and its employees to higher standards of
conduct than country-supplied peacekeepers, who benefit from the privileges and immunities of
the U.N. There have been numerous legal, moral, and practical objections raised to the
potential use of PMSCs, which are considered in detail. The Article concludes, however, that
given the U.N.’s urgent need for a reliable and sustainable rapid-reaction capability, this
option could be considered alongside other proposals for reform.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
The world is becoming a more peaceful place. Despite the seemingly
interminable reports of intra-state conflict, humanitarian crises, and transnational
terrorism, violence has declined to a historically low level. 1 Yet at the same time,
the task of those mandated by the international community to establish and keep
the peace, to protect civilians threatened by violence, and to help facilitate
enduring solutions to conflict, has become far more difficult.
Peacekeeping in the twenty-first century faces three new challenges. First,
the demand for peacekeeping intervention has increased dramatically over the
past fifteen years. As of September 2015, more than 123,000 peacekeepers,
police, and civilian personnel were deployed worldwide, a 40,000-troop increase
from the number deployed 10 years prior. 2 The 2015–2016 cash budget for U.N.
peacekeeping is some $8.27 billion, with other in-kind support provided by
various countries around the world. 3 In a summit led by the U.S. on the sidelines
of the 2015 U.N. General Assembly in September, more than 50 countries made
commitments to expand their contributions, amounting to an additional 40,000
new soldiers and police officers. 4
Second, U.N. peacekeepers today are responsible for fulfilling vastly more
complex, multifaceted mandates than in the past. Peacekeeping missions
established before the mid-1990s focused on ensuring that warring states

∗

1

2

Jared Genser (J.D. University of Michigan 2001; M.P.P. Harvard University 1998; B.S. Cornell
University 1995;) is an Associate of The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center. He is co-editor of THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Clare Garvie (J.D. Georgetown
University Law Center 2015; B.A. Barnard College, Columbia University 2009) is a law fellow
with the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law. They would like to thank Sara
Birkenthal and Elise Baranouski for their research and editing assistance.
See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED (2011); U.N. Under-Secretary Hervé Ladsous, New Challenges and Priorities for U.N.
Peacekeeping, Brookings Institution, (June 17, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/HL-remarks-brookings.pdf).
See Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. In contrast, the U.N.
reported 73,560 peacekeepers deployed in October 2004. See Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive,
Peacekeeping Fact Sheets for 2005, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml (last visited May 9, 2015).

3

See Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period From 1 July 2015 to 30 June
2016, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/69/24 (June 26, 2015).

4

See Somini Sengupta, Rallying Global Support, Obama Pledges Larger U.S. Role in Peacekeeping Missions,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/world/americas/
rallying-global-support-obama-pledges-larger-us-role-in-peacekeeping-missions.html.
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observed ceasefires. 5 In contrast, today’s mandates charge peacekeepers with
facilitating peace processes, protecting civilians, reforming security institutions,
vetting and training police forces, overseeing free and fair elections, and other
quintessential “nation-building” activities. 6
Third, these highly involved missions are often carried out in increasingly
unstable contexts. 7 At the behest of states faced with humanitarian crises or
rampant internal violence, the U.N. Security Council faces pressure to consider
intervention earlier in the course of a conflict. 8 As a result, peacekeeping forces
are now deployed into more volatile environments where there may not yet be
peace to keep; 9 more than two-thirds of deployed U.N. personnel currently
operate in active conflict zones. 10
New and old constraints on the U.N.’s ability to deploy peacekeeping
missions compound these challenges. The task of sustaining such high troop
levels, along with the increasing complexity and volatility of conflict areas, is
outstripping the willingness—and to some extent the capacity—of U.N.
member states to continue providing troops. 11 Estimates suggest that there is a
210,000-troop ceiling on global military resources available for peacekeeping. 12
The U.N. is losing in the competition with non-U.N. operations to secure the
5

6

7
8
9

10

11

12

See Patrick Cammaert, Issue Brief: The U.N. Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
INT’L PEACE INST. 7 (July 2013), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/The
%20UN%20Intervention%20Brigade%20in%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%
20Congo.pdf.
See id.; see Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, at vii–ix, 3–4, U.N. Doc. A/55/305,
S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter The Brahimi Report].
See The Brahimi Report, supra note 6, at 3–4.
See Ladsous, supra note 1.
See DACE WINTHER, REGIONAL MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DISTORTED MIRRORS, 36 (2013) (noting that “[t]oday . . . the tasks of
peacekeeping operations start in situations where there is no peace to keep, but where peace is
first to be created”).
See Press Release, General Assembly, Scale of United Nations Peacekeeping across Massive
Distances in Midst of Conflict Matched by Operational Complexity, Department Head Tells
Fourth Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/SPD/567 (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gaspd567.doc.htm. There has been an average of 122
peacekeeper deaths per year for the past ten years, from 2005 to 2014, compared to an average of
75 deaths per year for the ten years before 2005. See United Nations Peacekeeping Fatalities Per Year,
U.N. PEACEKEEPING, 1 (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/
documents/stats_1.pdf.
Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing
Countries: Providing For Peacekeeping No. 1, INT’L PEACE INSTITUTE, 1 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_pub_broadening_the_base.pdf.
Donald C. F. Daniel, Contemporary Patterns in Peace Operations, 2000–2010, in PROVIDING
PEACEKEEPERS: THE POLITICS, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
CONTRIBUTIONS 25, 28 n.6 (Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams eds., 2013).
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specialized capabilities needed for more multidimensional and robust
operations. 13 Countries that maintain these capabilities have shown themselves
resistant to placing their forces under U.N. command and control, preferring
instead to operate through unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions, or multi-state
alliances to achieve intervention objectives. 14 And countries with the largest and
best trained militaries, including the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and Japan,
only provide about 1.4 percent of the peacekeepers, police, and civilian
personnel, even though these countries are providing approximately 60.25
percent ($5 billion) of the annual peacekeeping budget. 15
In addition, the U.N. faces persistent obstacles to mobilizing peace
operations as quickly as crisis situations require. These obstacles stem from
political reluctance on the part of many member states to commit more than
token troop numbers, 16 as well as from logistical challenges in mobilizing forces
contributed by multiple countries. 17 It takes on average six months after a
Security Council resolution mandates a peacekeeping mission for forces to be
deployed on the ground. 18 And even when deployed, many U.N. peacekeeping
13
14

Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11, at 6–7.
Id. at 6.

15

Compare Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), How Much Does U.N. Peacekeeping Cost,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (last visited September 30,
2015), with DPKO, Troop and Police Contributors, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (last visited September 30, 2015).

16

Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11, at 1, 6 (noting that “the task of providing peacekeepers
continues to be met in a highly unequal manner with well over two-thirds of all U.N. uniformed
personnel coming from just twenty or so countries,” and that members of the Western European
and Others Group (WEOG) “have decided that only in exceptional circumstances [will] they
place anything other than token contributions under the U.N. chain of command.”).
See id.; see also U.S. General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent
Missions, GAO/NSAID-94-9, 40 (Dec. 1993), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/
153972.pdf (finding that the process by which the U.N. recruits peacekeepers through voluntary
contributions from member states delays deployment of peacekeepers missions, which
subsequently complicates on-the-ground operations).

17

18

See Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics,
Partnerships, and People, ¶ 198, U.N. Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446 (June 17, 2015) [hereinafter The
Ramos-Horta Report]; see also RODRIGO TAVARES, REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CAPACITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13 (2009) (noting that it takes on average “three to six
month[s]” to deploy a mission). For example, in the early 1990s, it took the Security Council an
entire year to coalesce the requisite elements for the deployment of ground forces into Bosnia.
Pakistan offered 3,000 troops, but was unable to equip or train them. Germany, and later Austria,
subsequently offered equipment, but domestic constitutional provisions prevented both countries
from training the troops on their use. Ultimately, Slovakia was able to provide the requisite
training after deployment a full year after the initial Security Council Resolution. See Maj. Anthony
G. DeMartino, Rapid Reaction Peacekeeping Under a Blue Flag: A Viable Response to Today’s Global
Environment 7 (May 14, 2002), available at handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402718. In the deployment
of its four most recent peacekeeping missions—the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated
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missions consist of troops that are not provided with sufficient training or
equipment. 19 The consequences of these delays and the deployment of
inadequate peacekeeping forces are increased violence, high civilian death tolls
and rates of displacement, and a decrease in the mission’s overall political
effectiveness. 20
The U.N. is well aware of these challenges. In 2000, then Secretary-General
Kofi Annan convened the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations to examine the
conduct and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and to offer
recommendations for improved performance. 21 This panel produced the
landmark Brahimi Report, which recommended that peacekeepers be ready for
deployment within 30 days of Security Council authorization for a traditional

Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the U.N. Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the U.N. Missions in South Sudan
(UNMISS), and the U.N. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) – the Security Council took
a similarly extended period of time for forces to be deployed following the passage of a Security
Council resolution mandating a peacekeeping force. See DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations Factsheet 2 (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/archive/2015/bnote
0115.pdf. The Security Council resolution authorizing MINUSCA, for example, was adopted on
April 10, 2014, and the mission did not deploy until September 15, 2014, meaning that it took the
Security Council over five months to put together the required elements for forces to be deployed
in the Central African Republic. See The U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic,
BETTER WORLD CAMPAIGN, http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping/missions/
central-african-republic.html; Louisa Waugh, Will MINUSCA Deployment Make a Difference in
CAR?, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/15/willminusca-deployment-make-a-difference-in-car-by-louisa-waugh/. In a similar vein, the Security
Council resolution authorizing MINUSMA was adopted on April 25, 2013 and the mission did
not deploy until July 1, 2013. See DPKO, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml; U.N. Takes Over
Mali Peacekeeping Mission, AL JAZEERA (July 1, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013
/07/20137182846984106.html. Similarly, the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
UNMISS was adopted on July 8, 2011 and the mission did not deploy until August 26, 2011. See
DPKO, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping
/missions/unmiss/; U.N. News Centre, U.N. Deploys Peacekeepers to Help Deter Violence in South
Sudan’s Jonglei State (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39390
&Cr=South+Sudan&Cr1%23.VdzejHi4mu4#.Vd0_p7xViko. And the Security Council
Resolution authorizing UNISFA was adopted on June 27, 2011 and the mission did not deploy
until July 27, 2011. See DPKO, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, http://www.un.org
/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/; U.N. News Centre, U.N. Troops Move into Sudanese Area of
Abyei, (July 27, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39167#.Vjaefn6rQuU.
19

See Mohamad Ghazi Janaby, The Legal Status of Employees of Private Military/Security
Companies Participating in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 13 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 82, 86
(2015), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1178&context=njihr.

20

See William J. Durch et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of U.N. Peace Operations 63 (Dec. 2003),
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf.

21

See The Brahimi Report, supra note 6.
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mission and 90 days for a complex mission. 22 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Kimoon subsequently created a new review process in October 2014, establishing
the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to determine how to
ensure peacekeeping operations remain an effective tool for promoting
international peace and security in light of the challenges and complexities of the
field in the twenty-first century. 23 This new panel, chaired by former East Timor
President José Ramos-Horta, published a new, comprehensive report in June
2015, and expressed serious concern that the U.N. had been unable to come
close to the Brahimi Report deployment target timeframes. The panel
underscored the serious challenges posed by the inability of the U.N. to deploy
peacekeeping missions rapidly:
Slow deployment is one of the greatest impediments to more effective peace
operations. When a mission trickles into a highly demanding environment, it
is dangerously exposed on the ground and initial high expectations turn to
disappointment, frustration and anger . . . . The Security Council has no
standing army to call upon. Reliance on ad hoc solutions for rapidly
deploying new missions and for crisis response has limited the timeliness
and effectiveness of international response. However, repeated calls for a
global on-call standby capacity have foundered time and again on concerns
about predictability, availability and cost. 24

In response to this challenge, the Ramos-Horta Report said that a “small
United Nations ‘vanguard’ capability should be considered to allow the United
Nations to insert a quickly responding military capability into a new mission area
or to reinforce an existing mission.” 25 In addition, it added that “[t]he Secretariat
should develop options to generate and place on standby a small dedicated
regional strategic reserve contingent for a group of missions . . . .” 26 As it
examined various options, however, the Panel focused on redeploying existing
peacekeepers from nearby missions in the same region, re-hatting other
deployed forces of U.N. members, or building on emerging regional capabilities
such as the African Standby Force and E.U. Battlegroups. 27 Yet all of these
options have existed previously, rely heavily on the political will of outside third
parties not within the direct control of the U.N. Department for Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO), and take, on average, six months to deploy.

22
23

24
25
26
27

Id. at xi.
See U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Statement on Appointment of High-Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151.
The Ramos-Horta Report, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 195–196.
Id. ¶ 199.
Id.
Id. ¶ 202.
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Given these constraints, the U.N. could also examine establishing a robust
rapid-reaction capability through contracting with private military and security
companies (PMSCs). 28 A contracted rapid-reaction force would enable the U.N.
to respond directly to emerging crises, begin protecting civilians closer to the
onset of violence, and create conditions in which a longer-term,
multidimensional peacekeeping force can operate safely and more effectively.
Using private companies in this capacity lends the training, expertise, and rapidreaction abilities already existing in the private market to U.N. peacekeeping
efforts, curing the logistical challenges constraining the U.N.’s ability to mobilize
third parties quickly. Furthermore, using PMSCs would allow for the size of the
force to expand or contract as needed, thereby allowing for reductions in costs.
In addition, such an approach would help circumvent political reticence on the
part of troop contributing countries (TCCs) to commit forces to more
dangerous contexts, 29 would serve to broaden the pool of forces available to the
U.N. for peacekeeping endeavors, and would alleviate the current burden on
overstretched U.N. peacekeeping missions. Private contractors additionally may
exhibit greater levels of professionalism, and be subject to a higher degree of
accountability for bad acts than the current system commands over countrycontributed peacekeeping troops.
Section II of this paper examines prior proposals for the establishment of a
rapid-reaction force, which have included calls for a standing U.N. force and
efforts to build rapid-reaction capabilities into the existing TCC makeup of
peacekeeping missions. This Section argues that these proposals remain
politically and logistically difficult, and that using PMSC troops could
circumvent these defects while achieving the same end goals. Section III
examines the question of whether a system of direct contracts between the U.N.
and PMSCs would be permitted under international law and in light of the
obligations of U.N. member states under the U.N. Charter. It argues that neither
international law nor the current role U.N. member states play in providing
28

These companies are also referred to as “private military contractors” (PMCs) or “private security
companies” (PSCs). For the purposes of this paper, PMSC is broadly used to refer to a company
that advertises rapid-reaction force capabilities. For a longer discussion about the distinctions
between various forms of private military and security companies, Kevin O’Brien, What Should and
What Should Not Be Regulated?, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION
OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 29, 34–40 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).

29

Some U.N. member states have asserted political rationales for contributing to peacekeeping
missions, such as enhancing a country’s perceived national prestige or responding to political
pressure from other countries. See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11, at 3–4. However these
generally counsel in favor of countries contributing troops to “safer” or easier missions, not
rapid-reaction engagements. The expressed political goals are still met through contributions to
safe missions, and the country does not face domestic opposition for placing forces in harm’s way
abroad.
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peacekeepers presents a meaningful constraint on the DPKO’s ability to
contract with PMSCs. Finally, Section IV examines serious concerns of privateactor accountability to human rights and humanitarian legal obligations. This
Section explains that with the proper licensing and contractual framework, these
forces could actually be held to a higher level of accountability than
peacekeepers. As a whole, this Article suggests that the use of PMSCs in a rapidreaction capacity could greatly enhance the U.N.’s ability to address the
challenges of peacekeeping in the twenty-first century, and is a proposal that
warrants consideration.

II. P ROPOSALS FOR A U.N. R APID -R EACTION F ORCE
A. The Potential for a Standing U.N. Rapid-Reaction Force
Support for the idea of establishing rapid-reaction force capabilities as part
of the U.N. peacekeeping toolbox gained momentum in the mid-1990s, after the
international community failed to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 30 In
1996, a group of 26 U.N. member countries 31 called on the U.N. to establish a
force that could be deployed into situations to help prevent crisis breakout and
escalation. 32 The group additionally submitted a number of proposals for the
composition of the rapid-reaction force to the DPKO. 33 The rapid-reaction
force would be a small, highly trained unit of 5,000 or fewer troops with a broad
30

31

32

33

See Cristian Mazzei, Peace Operations Training Inst., Peacekeeping, UN Stand-by Force and
Rapid Deployment: A Critical Analysis, 7–12 (May 2009), issuu.com/peaceops/docs/mazzei.
The “Friends of rapid reaction,” as the group came to be known, included Argentina, Australia,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland,
Senegal, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and Zambia. See H. Peter Langille, Conflict Prevention:
Options for Rapid Deployment and U.N. Standing Forces, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (2000), available at
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40962.html. Note that some
reports indicate that twenty-four countries comprised the group; others list twenty-seven
countries. See, for example, Frederick Bonnart, It’s Time for a Standing U.N. Rapid Reaction Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/22/opinion/22ihtedbonn.t.html. The group intentionally excluded the permanent members of the Security Council
in an attempt to counterbalance the existing concentration of authority in these countries. See
Jochen Prantl & Jean E. Krasno, Informal Groups of Member States, in THE UNITED NATIONS:
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY 311, 349–351 (Jean E. Krasno ed.,
2004).
Bonnart, supra note 31. Efforts to develop rapid-reaction capabilities were not confined to the
efforts of the “Friends.” The U.K., France, and U.S. were also engaged in improving the
peacekeeping capabilities of African troop-contributing countries, and Italy and Argentina had
presented proposals for the creation of a rapid-response force for humanitarian purposes. See
Langille, supra note 31.
Id.; Mazzei, supra note 30, at 9–12.
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range of force capabilities, able to respond in a matter of days to an emerging
crisis following Security Council authorization. 34 It would be a permanent,
standing unit under the ownership of the international community that
guaranteed the immediate availability of troops when necessary. 35 And it would
be designed to serve as a stopgap measure of strictly-limited duration,
complementary to either existing or subsequent broader peacekeeping initiatives.
Its primary purpose would be to conduct preventive action—protection of
civilians and deterrence of further violence—in the months between a Security
Council authorization of a robust international peacekeeping mission and its
deployment. 36 As previously mentioned, the Brahimi Report released in 2000
echoed the call for more rapid deployment into crisis situations, setting the
targets of 30 days between Security Council authorization and deployment for a
traditional mission and 90 days for a complex mission. 37 However, little progress
was made on these goals over the next 15 years, and the independent panel
headed by José Ramos-Horta faced a virtually unchanged field in 2015. Although
the Ramos-Horta Report did not take a position on whether this accelerated
deployment capacity should take the form of a U.N.-owned rapid-reaction force,
it stated, “the Panel believes that the United Nations needs to be provided with
the minimum capacity to reinforce a mission in crisis and more rapidly establish
a new mission presence, whether deploying on its own or following a bridging
force.” 38
All of these proposals identify the contours of a force that would greatly
enhance the U.N.’s efficiency and effectiveness in responding to emerging
security threats. There are at least four crucial, overlapping benefits that would
be supplied by such a force: prevention, credibility, cost-effectiveness, and
deterrence. 39 First, a brigade, capable of deployment in the days following a
Security Council resolution and mandated to directly engage in hostilities to the
extent necessary, would be able to mitigate tensions as they arise, stem the
entrenchment of violence, and prevent the escalation of a humanitarian crisis. 40
Second, and relatedly, the ability to deploy a rapid response unit would establish
34
35
36
37
38
39

40

Bonnart, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
See The Brahimi Report, supra note 6.
See The Ramos-Horta Report, supra note 18, ¶ 198.
See DeMartino, supra note 18, at 37–39 (identifying the four advantages to a standing rapidreaction force to be responsiveness, cost efficiency, credibility, and deterrence).
See id. at 37; see also Mazzei, supra note 30, at 6 (describing that in the context of the 1994 Rwandan
genocide, the “late reaction, namely deployment of a peace force, resulted in an uncontrolled
escalation much [more] complex and difficult to deal with” and noting that rapid-reaction
capabilities could serve to prevent a similar escalation of violence in future conflicts).
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the potential to drastically reduce the human suffering perpetuated by the
endemic delays to peacekeeping deployment that persist today. 41 Acquiring this
capability would enable the U.N. to give effect to the often-repeated mantra of
“never again,” referring to the failures in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
elsewhere in recent decades. 42 Third, such a force could be a more cost-effective
approach to peacekeeping in the long-term. Some missions today, including the
forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali, find
themselves caught between the need to combat violent groups posing an
immediate threat to both civilians and U.N. personnel, and the need to fulfill
their mandates of fostering national dialogue and conflict resolution. 43
Consequently, these forces find themselves unable to successfully address either
their mandate or the immediate concerns on the ground. 44 A successful rapidreaction “pre-peacekeeping” force would help ensure that the larger, more
robust, and vastly more expensive peacekeeping missions deploy to less volatile
environments, enhancing the ability of the larger peacekeeping mission to
conduct long-term “peace-building” activities. 45 And fourth, the U.N. would
acquire a powerful deterrent to violence through the ability to credibly threaten
rapid, robust deployment. The potential for a swift response to destabilizing
acts, efforts to spoil a peace process, or attacks against civilians would alter the
cost-benefit analysis for belligerents who currently consider robust international
intervention to be either a remote or highly-delayed threat. 46

41
42

43

44

45
46

DeMartino, supra note 18, at 37.
See, for example, Press Release, Deputy Secretary-General, Repeating ‘Never Again’ After Atrocity
‘a Sign of Continued Failure’, Deputy Secretary-General Says at Event on Rwanda Genocide,
U.N. Press
Release
DSG/SM/736-AFR/2794 (Jan. 15, 2014), available
at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/dsgsm736.doc.htm (discussing how the credibility of the
U.N. system is dependent on it acquiring the ability to respond and prevent atrocities in a more
timely manner).
See U.N. News Centre, DR Congo: Security Council Condemns Massacres of Civilians, Attacks on
Peacekeepers, (Nov. 26, 2014), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID
=49455#.VT1aeK1Vikp; see U.N. News Centre, Mali: Ban voices concern over series of targeted attacks
against U.N. mission and personnel, (Apr. 24, 2015), available to http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=50685#.VT1asK1Vikp.
See Jessica Hatcher and Alex Perry, Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern
Congo, TIME, Nov. 26, 2012, available at http://world.time.com/2012/11/26/definingpeacekeeping-downward-the-u-n-debacle-in-eastern-congo/.
See Langille, supra note 31; Mazzei, supra note 30, at 9; DeMartino, supra note 18, at 38.
See DeMartino, supra note 18, at 39; see also COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR
GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 340
(1995) (noting that “the ability to back up preventive diplomacy with a measure of immediate and
convincing deployment on the ground . . . would be a deterrent [and] would give support for
negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes”).
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The rapid-reaction force proposals offered by U.N. member states and the
Ramos-Horta Report, however, all require undertaking substantial reforms to
the U.N. system—reforms that have not garnered sufficient support or
momentum to be implemented. 47 Primarily, the proposal for a U.N. standing
army remains deeply unpopular on both political and financial grounds. 48
Furthermore, there would need to be a commitment by a member state to
“adopt,” or host and maintain, the brigade. 49 Unfortunately, the states with the
capacity, training, and equipment to host such forces are those that already
display a deep reluctance to contribute peacekeepers to regularly-constituted
missions. 50
In addition, these proposals have practical limitations, remaining
fundamentally constrained in their capacity to respond to multiple crises at one
time. The deployment of a standing U.N. rapid-reaction force would render it
unavailable to any other crisis for the duration of its mandate. Maintaining
multiple standing forces, a feature not proposed by the “friends of rapid
reaction” countries, would balloon the overhead annual cost of the initiative and
further exacerbate political skepticism by reviving the specter of a U.N. standing
army. 51

B. Rapid-Reaction Force Contributed by Member States
The endemic conflict in the DRC and the U.N.’s fifteen-year commitment
there has given birth to an alternate model for a rapid-reaction force. This
development came in the wake of the failure of the existing U.N. Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO),
to protect the second-largest city in the country from capture by the brutal M23
rebel group in November 2012, despite operating under the most robust
47

48

49
50
51

Mazzei, supra note 30, at 16 (noting that “[u]nfortunately, controversy and political opposition
have . . . diminished the momentum of the project”). Subsequent proposals like the Brahimi
Report, acknowledged delays as one of the key failures in U.N. peacekeeping efforts overall, but
significantly retreated from the idea of establishing a rapid-reaction force. These proposals
recommended instead that the U.N. establish an “on-call list” of 100 or so qualified military
officers to promote the more rapid development of tactical plans, and that U.N. member states
establish “pools” of police officers and related experts earmarked for deployment to peacekeeping
missions. The Brahimi Report, supra note 6, at xi–xii.
See Langille, supra note 31. See Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Elect Kofi
Annan, Press Release, at 9, U.N. Doc. GA/9212 (Dec. 18, 1996) (quoting Kofi Annan, newly
elected U.N. Secretary-General: “I don’t think we can have a standing United Nations army. The
membership is not ready for that. There are financial questions and great legal issues as to which
laws would apply and where it would be stationed.”).
Mazzei, supra note 30, at 9–10.
See, supra, Introduction. See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11.
Mazzei, supra note 30.
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mandate authorized by the Security Council to date. 52 In March 2013, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 2098, which extended the mandate of
MONUSCO for another year and established the U.N. Force Intervention
Brigade. 53 The resolution tasked the Intervention Brigade with carrying out
“targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” 54
to protect civilians and “neutraliz[e] armed groups.” 55 The Brigade is authorized
to act either unilaterally or jointly with DRC national forces. It is composed of
3,000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, consisting of three
infantry battalions, one artillery, and one special force and reconnaissance
company. 56 MONUSCO’s mandate was just extended until March 31, 2016, by
unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 2211. 57
Resolution 2098 clearly states that this Intervention Brigade does not create
precedent to change the agreed-upon rules or standards of peacekeeping
operations to allow for offensive capabilities. 58 This is underscored by the debate
surrounding the resolution prior to its ultimate unanimous adoption. The
representative from Argentina, for example, expressed concerns that the force
was improperly tasked with “enforcing peace rather than keeping it.” 59 Indeed,
China’s representative noted that his country was willing to vote in favor of the
creation of a specialized brigade only because it would not create precedent that
would undercut traditional peacekeeping principles. 60

52

See Pete Jones & David Smith, Congo Rebels Take Goma with Little Resistance and to Little Cheer, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2012, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/20/congo
-rebel-m23-take-goma; see also Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and the Great Lakes Region, at 1, 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/2013/119 (Feb. 27, 2013).

53

S.C. Res. 2098, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2098 (Mar. 28, 2013).
Id. ¶ 12(b).

54
55
56

Id.
Id. ¶ 9; see Christoph Vogel, DRC: Assessing the Performance of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade,
AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (July 14, 2014), http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/14/drc-assessingthe-performance-of-monuscos-force-intervention-brigade-by-christoph-vogel/.

57

S.C. Res. 2211, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2211 (Mar. 26, 2015); Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2211
(2015), Security Council Extends Mission, Intervention Brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N.
Meetings Coverage SC/11834 (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/
sc11834.doc.htm.

58

S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 53 ¶ 9 (deciding “that MONUSCO shall . . . on an exceptional basis and
without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an
‘Intervention Brigade’”).
‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/10964 (Mar. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm.

59

60

Id.
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Concerns about the legality and desirability of the use of force by U.N.
peacekeepers have existed since the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) was
deployed by the General Assembly on November 7, 1956, to secure an end to
the Suez Crisis. 61 While the Brahimi Report attempted to advance the concept of
“robust peacekeeping,” the absence of strategic clarity surrounding the issue of
force continues to be problematic. 62 This issue was provided added salience after
1999 with the introduction of broader mandates authorizing the use of force for
the protection of civilians. 63
Nonetheless, the Security Council reaffirmed its position that it has the
authority to authorize a peacekeeping mission with offensive capabilities under
the U.N. Charter when it established the Intervention Brigade. 64 Similarly, the
DPKO has insisted that the Intervention Brigade is not a “revolution” in
peacekeeping operations, but rather an “evolution” in the U.N.’s capacity to
engage in increasingly complex conflict zones. 65 This position is supported by
previous peace-enforcement engagements in the DRC. In 2003, Security Council
Resolution 1484 authorized a short-term, E.U.-led Interim Multinational
Emergency Force to recapture and secure the country’s major airport and
provide more robust protection to civilians. 66 Between 2005 and 2007, forces
operating under the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC), the predecessor to MONUSCO, conducted offensive operations
against rebels in the Ituri district and the North and South Kivu provinces of the
DRC, signaling a willingness by the U.N. to transition from reactive tactics
primarily focused on protection and defense to more aggressive “pursuit” or
offensive operations. 67 Regardless of the way the Secretary-General and DPKO
decide to develop a rapid-reaction force, providing it with prospective offensive

61

See DPKO, United Nations Emergency Force, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/past/unefi.htm.

62

See United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, University of Essex School of Law, UN
Peacekeeping and the Model Status of Forces Agreement, 7 (Aug. 26, 2010), https://www.essex.ac.uk/
plrp/documents/model_sofa_peliminay_report_august_2010.pdf.
For instance, see the following missions MONUC/DRC (1999), ONUB (2004), UNOCI (2004),
UNAMSIL (1999), UNMIL (2003), MINUSTAH (2004), UNMIS (2005), UNAMID (2007),
MINURCAT (2007), MONUSCO (2010).

63

64

See also Cammaert, supra note 5, at 7 (“The Security Council . . . believes its authority to deploy the
Intervention Brigade is enshrined in the U.N. Charter.”).

65

Id.
S.C. Res. 1484, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1484 (May 30, 2003).

66
67

See Julie Reynaert, MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection in the Kivus, 16, INT’L PEACE
INFORMATION SERVICE, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D11C9B161C3
43539C1257847004BF8BF-Full_Report.pdf.
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capabilities like the Intervention Brigade would be of great value in securing the
peace and protecting civilians.
In addition to falling within the authority of the Security Council, the
Intervention Brigade acts under the requirements of international humanitarian
law. It operates in an area where there is an ongoing armed conflict between
Congolese and non-state armed forces. 68 The conduct of the Congolese forces
and non-state armed groups is clearly bound by international humanitarian law, 69
and so the question arises when considering this DRC rapid-reaction force as a
model: to what extent are the U.N. forces as well as PMSCs contracted by the
U.N. also bound by international humanitarian law, and what is the content of
that law as it applies to the U.N.? 70 In the case of the Intervention Brigade, the
best characterization of the conflict that it engages in with the non-state armed
groups in the Congo is that of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). 71 The
Intervention Brigade acts with the consent of the Congolese government—
indeed in concert with the Congolese armed forces 72—and is only engaged in
hostilities with non-state armed groups within the Congo. 73
Given the conclusion that the law of NIACs applies to the Intervention
Brigade in its dealing with non-state armed forces in the Congo, at a minimum,
the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the
Brigade’s operations. 74 Common Article 3 requires that the parties to the conflict
treat persons not taking an active part in hostilities humanely, and in relation to
such persons, those parties must refrain from:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the

68

See Devon Whittle, Peacekeeping in Conflict: The Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO, and the
Application of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces, 46 GEO. J INT’L L. 838,
846 (2015), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx
00315000837.PDF.

69

See Louise Arimatus, The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993–2010, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 147 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).

70

See Whittle, supra note 68, at 846.
Id. at 858.

71
72

See S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 53, ¶ 12(b) (authorizing the Brigade to undertake its mission “either
unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC.”).

73

See id., which authorizes the Brigade to undertake operation “to prevent the expansion of all
armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them.”

74

See Whittle, supra note 68, at 859.
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judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized
peoples. 75

Thus the Intervention Brigade is, at a minimum, required to afford the
above protections to all persons not participating in the conflict and, in
particular, to any non-government forces that have “laid down their arms” or are
hors de combat. 76 Beyond Common Article 3, the provisions of international
humanitarian law applying to NIACs that form part of customary international
law can also be said to apply to the Brigade. 77 These include requirements to
distinguish between civilians and combatants when targeting attacks, 78
prohibitions on “methods and means of warfare calculated to inflict unnecessary
suffering,” 79 and perfidy. 80 This model of U.N. peacekeepers as bound by
international humanitarian law is the standard to which PMSCs contracted as a
rapid-response force should be held.
The Intervention Brigade has largely been viewed as a success. However, as
a model for future rapid-reaction forces, it suffers from many of the same
obstacles faced by existing peacekeeping missions. Most critical is its inability to
provide a truly rapid response. Despite its small size relative to other
peacekeeping missions, it still took five months following Resolution 2098 for
the troops to deploy and become operational. 81 Furthermore, it deployed into
the existing structure of a well-established U.N. presence on the ground; this
delay would likely be exacerbated in a situation in which the force was deploying
in advance of a larger peacekeeping mission. In addition, while composed of
75

76
77

78

See Whittle, supra note 68, at 859; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions].
See Whittle, supra note 68, at 859; Geneva Conventions, supra note 75, common art. 3.
See Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 64 (1997); INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
IHL, Rule 1.
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 26
(2006), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-iicrc-eng.pdf.

79

U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin: Observance By United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).

80

See Whittle, supra note 68, at 859–60.
See Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the U.N. in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, INT’L PEACE INST., (Nov. 2014), available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/151-the-crisis-in-drc/5651-theintervention-brigade-legal-issues-for-the-un-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo.
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regional forces from a select few countries, the Intervention Brigade still relied
on the ability and political willingness of U.N. member states to contribute
forces. 82 As such, this model operates within the same logistical and political
framework as the current peacekeeping structure, which faces persistent
coordination and capacity challenges. 83 In short, while the Intervention Brigade
can be hailed as a welcome moderate success within the peacekeeping goals in
the DRC, 84 it is unlikely this TCC-based composition could serve as a model for
future rapid-reaction forces in other contexts. It seems equally unlikely that
transferring assets from one peacekeeping mission to another in a crisis or
relying on national and regional standby arrangements will be sufficient to
address the rapid-reaction requirements of U.N. peacekeeping in the future.

III. T HE U.N.’ S U SE OF P RIVATE M ILITARY C ONTRACTORS
Prior proposals or models for U.N. rapid-reaction capabilities have sourced
troops in one of two ways, either from the establishment of a standing unit of
“international U.N. military servants,” 85 or through the existing practice of
requesting contributions from U.N. member states. 86 There is a third option
available to the U.N., however—one that is more practicable and efficient than
the others, while ultimately accomplishing the same goals. Since the early 1990s,
the market of PMSCs has drastically expanded. 87 Many of these private
companies have at their disposal highly-trained military personnel and
equipment, as well as expertise in humanitarian, stabilization, and development
missions. 88
82

83
84
85
86
87

88

The initial idea of deploying an offensive military force came out of the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in July 2012 and had widespread support from regional
countries. See Issue Brief, supra note 5, at 5. It is unclear whether this level of regional support and
initiative would exist in other contexts. In addition, it was not feasible for the ICGLR countries to
deploy peacekeepers independently of broader support, due to financial constraints. Id.
See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11.
See Sheeran & Case, supra note 81.
See Bonnart, supra note 31.
See S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 53.
See Sean McFate, The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order
8–10 (2014).
See Åse Gilje Østensen, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, U.N. Use of Private
Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies, 7, 11 (2011), http://psm.du.edu/media/
documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/dcaf_ostensen_un_use_of_pmscs.pdf; see, for example,
Subject Matter Expertise, IDS INT’L, http://www.idsinternational.net/we-are-experts (last visited
April 24, 2015). In 2006, PMSC Blackwater (now Academi) Vice Chairman J. Cofer Black
announced that his company had the capacity to deploy a small, rapid-reaction force into conflicts
such as the one in Darfur, Sudan at the time. See Rebecca Weiner, “Peace Corp.”, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 23, 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/944/peace_corp.html.
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The U.N., in fact, already contracts with PMSCs for risk assessments,
logistical support, and training in support of peacekeeping efforts. 89 Examples of
PMSCs supplying services to U.N. peacekeeping operations include Dyncorp
providing helicopter transport and satellite network communications to the
U.N.-sanctioned International Force in East Timor, while Defence Systems
Limited (DSL) provided both logistical and intelligence support for national
contingencies participating in that mission. 90 Pacific Architects & Engineers
(PAE) provided general logistics in support of the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
in 2000 and 2003 and various logistical services to MONUC in 2001. 91 Indeed,
the Ramos-Horta Report notes that the Panel “supports . . . the use of properly
vetted private security contractors where they are a necessary option” to assist
missions without military components. 92 Barring an express legal prohibition on
the use of private actors in missions with military components, the U.N. could
capitalize on the resources available to it in the private sector and establish
contracts with PMSCs to supply comprehensive rapid-reaction capabilities
including personnel, equipment, and logistics.
Many commentators have expressed legal and practical concerns about the
U.N.’s use of private contractors. 93 This Section examines two of the more
persuasive challenges raised. The first argument is that PMSCs are a modern
equivalent of mercenaries and are banned under international law. 94 The second
is that the use of PMSCs would frustrate the necessary role U.N. member states
play in contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. This Section argues that
neither of these challenges, however, presents legal barriers to the U.N.’s use of
PMSCs.

89

Id. at 11.

90

Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.

91
92
93

94

The Ramos-Horta Report, supra note 18, ¶ 300.
See, for example, Lou Pingeot, Global Policy Forum, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security
Companies and the U.N., (June 2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_
Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf; see also Sarah Percy, Morality and Regulation, in FROM
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 11,
11–28 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
See Louise Doswald-Beck, Private Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law, in FROM
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 115,
122–123 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
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A. International Legal Prohibitions on the Use of Private
Military Actors
Does the use of PMSCs violate international law? If PMSCs are viewed as
the modern-day iteration of mercenaries, 95 or “soldiers for hire,” there appears
to be a solid basis for arguing that their use is illegal. Thanks in large part to their
widespread engagement on the African continent during the 1960s and 1970s,
mercenaries came to be associated with fomenting instability and threatening
sovereignty and the right to self-determination—fighting on behalf of the
highest-paying party to preserve quasi-colonial structures, achieve independence
for breakaway regions, or stage coups d’états. 96 Against this backdrop,
international and regional bodies codified rules to expressly prohibit mercenary
use. In 1977, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) adopted the
Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. 97 The U.N. system
followed suit a decade later. The Commission on Human Rights created the
position of U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries, 98 and the
General Assembly adopted the International Convention against the
95

“Whilst the term ‘mercenary’ can be used in a generic—and often politically loaded sense—it has
a precise meaning from a legal viewpoint. The definition of mercenary is found in three
documents: Article 47 of Protocol I, the “Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa” of
1977, and the “International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries”
adopted in 1989 by the United Nations General Assembly. According to Article 47 of Protocol I,
a mercenary is any person who: (a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in
the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of
a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a
national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a
State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. This
definition, which requires that all six conditions be fulfilled, has been judged unworkable by many
authors and will very seldom be applicable to [PMSCs]. . . . From a strictly legal point of view, it
appears that the answer to the question of whether individuals employed by private companies are
mercenaries will most of the time be negative, as these persons will usually fall outside the
conjunctive definition provided for in international instruments.” See Alexandre Faite, Involvement
of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law, 4 Def. Studies
166, 170–71 (2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-afaite.pdf.

96

Angela McIntyre & Taya Weiss, Weak governments in search of strength: Africa’s experience of mercenaries
and private military companies, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, 67–68 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CM/817 (1977)
[hereinafter O.A.U. Convention].
Comm’n on Human Rights, at 60, U.N. Doc. E/1987/16 (1987) available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/1987/18(SUPP).

97

98
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Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 99 Protocol I
additional to the Geneva Conventions, which entered into force in 1978, further
constrains the application of its protections to mercenary forces. 100 As recently
as 1999, in a report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special
Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries stated that “mercenarism is an
international crime . . . the mere fact that it is a government that recruits
mercenaries, or contracts companies that recruit mercenaries, in its own defense
or to provide reinforcements in armed conflicts, does not make such actions any
less illegal or illegitimate.” 101
Despite this unsparing and unequivocal assessment, however, there are
four counterarguments to the blanket proposition that PMSCs should be
considered illegitimate or their operations illegal under international law. First,
there are concrete distinctions that can be drawn between mercenarism and the
practices and structures of modern PMSCs. Mercenaries, motivated by the
prospect of earning money from the highest bidder in military conflicts,

99

Int’l Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]. The convention
stipulates various ways states should take responsibility for PMSC activities. It
emphasizes state responsibility to regulate and monitor the industry, establish
licensing regimes and draft laws that would hold companies legally
accountable . . . The convention also aims to establish an avenue of redress to
potential victims of human rights abuses by PMSCs. In an effort to give effect
to the convention, the draft entails the creation of an international committee
to maintain international oversight of state initiatives and measures
implemented to regulate PMSCs. The committee would also be tasked with
mediation between states where human rights violations are reportedly
committed by PMSC personnel, and the home state or contracting state of the
company. As a means to prevent human rights abuses, the convention thus
continues to underscore the importance of reinstating the state as the main
locus of action regarding the control of PMSCs.
See Østensen, supra note 88, at 60.

100

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8, 1977)
[hereinafter Protocol I].

101

See U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION ¶ 37
(Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/
mercenaries.pdf [hereinafter U.K. Green Paper] (quoting the January 1999 U.N. Special
Rapporteur report to the Commission on Human Rights). The General Assembly, moreover, has
passed more than 100 resolutions touching upon the topic of mercenaries since the late 1960s,
many of which equate mercenaries to international criminals. This has fostered institutional
hostility towards considering the positive uses of private military forces, despite the rather narrow
focus of the General Assembly on the threat private actors pose to nations seeking selfdetermination. See Sarah Percy, The Security Council and the Use of Private Force, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE
1945 624, 624–40 (Adam Roberts et al. eds., 2010).
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destabilized conflicts. 102 A PMSC, by contrast, is a corporate entity, which
incentivizes its directors to maintain the reputation of the PMSC as a respectable
organization; switching sides mid-conflict or allowing its employees to commit
abuses unchecked would likely prove to be an unsustainable business model. 103
PMSCs conduct their work under contractual obligations to their clients, with a
focus on providing tactical support and often operating side-by-side with their
principal, rather than conducting independent action on behalf of a distant
client. 104 It could be countered that the language employed by the Special
Rapporteur in the 1999 statement can be read to encompass the modern PMSC.
However, the broader context of this statement defined the actors so strongly
condemned as those likely to “carry out acts that impede the self-determination
of peoples, to jeopardize the independence and sovereignty of the state itself, or
to condone actions that may do severe harm to their citizens’ lives and
security.” 105 Any rapid-reaction force would be contracted by the DPKO and
would operate exclusively within the mandate authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. Such missions are only authorized with the explicit consent of the state
and under strict requirements of adherence to international human rights and
humanitarian law.
Second, none of the definitions put forth in the OAU and U.N.
Conventions Against Mercenaries and Protocol I apply well to the use of PMSCs
by the U.N. 106 The OAU Convention prohibits the actions of persons or groups
who intend “to overthrow by force of arms or by other means, the government”
of a member state. 107 Both the U.N. Convention and Protocol I contain
exceptions for peacekeeping or similar interventions—individuals “sent by a
State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its
armed forces.” 108 While this does not expressly cover a private actor contracted
by the U.N. to engage in peacekeeping, it would be hard to argue that privatelycontracted interventions lie outside those interventions permitted by the
exception. And as a matter of practice, the Security Council does not send
102

See, for example, U.N. Convetion, supra note 99.
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See U.K. Green Paper, supra note 101, ¶ 38; see also DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET
FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING SECURITY 31–38 (2005).
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For a more comprehensive discussion about the distinctions between mercenaries and modernday PMSCs, as well as the distinctions between various forms of private military and security
companies, see O’Brien, supra note 28, at 34–40.
U.K. Green Paper, supra note 101, at ¶ 37.
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See O’Brien, supra note 28, at 31 (asserting that “[l]egitimate PMCs do not constitute ‘mercenaries’
under any of the existing legal (national or international) or otherwise established definitions
today—themselves deeply problematic”).
O.A.U. Convention, supra note 97, art. 1(a).
U.N. Convention, supra note 99, art. 1(e); Protocol I, supra note 100, art. 47(2)(f).
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peacekeeping missions into member states without their approval. Moreover, the
actor authorizing both a rapid-reaction force and peacekeeping mission would
be the Security Council—the U.N. body vested by states with the authority to
take actions necessary to ensure peace and stability. A PMSC used in
peacekeeping may be regarded as an “agent” of the U.N. 109 According to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion in Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the U.N., the term “agent” can be used to refer to those
who are contracted by the U.N. to carry out its functions. It stated that:
The Court understands the word “agent” in the most liberal sense, that is to
say, any person who, whether a paid official or not, and whether
permanently employed or not, has been charged by an organ of the
organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its
functions—in short, any person through whom it acts. 110

Similarly, in its advisory opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22,
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N., the ICJ stated that “[i]n
practice, according to the information supplied by the Secretary-General, the
U.N. has had occasion to entrust missions—increasingly varied in nature—to
persons not having the status of U.N. officials.” In the commentary on the Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, the U.N.
International Law Commission is explicit that the term “agent” does not refer
only to “officials but also to other persons acting for the U.N. on the basis of
functions conferred by an organ of the organisation.” 111 Given these
interpretations, a PMSC hired by the U.N. to advance the deployment of a
peacekeeping operation or supplement an existing operation would be classified
as an agent of the U.N. 112 This would mean that the PMSC’s personnel would
presumptively have the legal status of peacekeepers. In other words, they would
be civilians and have the privileges and immunities of U.N. personnel if not
actively involved in armed conflict. 113 However, by contract, the U.N. could
require PMSCs to surrender this immunity and be held to a higher standard of
accountability.
Third, the U.N. has, in recent years, retreated from the position expressed
by the Special Rapporteur in 1999 that mercenaries and private companies
always operate illegitimately. In 2005, the Working Group on the Use of

109
110
111
112
113

See Janaby, supra note 19, at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Mercenaries replaced the position of Special Rapporteur. 114 With this succession,
the focus of the office shifted away from promoting the complete ban on
mercenaries and towards creating international standards to regulate, monitor,
and oversee the activities of mercenaries and private military companies. 115
Indeed, the final report of the Special Rapporteur, published in 2005, “strongly”
recommended “that the U.N. re-examine the relevance of the term ‘mercenary.’
This derogatory term is completely unacceptable and is too often used to
describe fully legal and legitimate companies engaged in vital support operations
for humanitarian peace and stability operations.” 116 The mercenary association
that has lingered around the PMSC industry is seen as a particular impediment to
its positive contributions to the U.N. and removing this association is critical to
changing misperceptions among policy-makers and the public. 117
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the U.N. already has an extensive
and growing relationship with PMSCs. Private military and security firms supply
the U.N. with armed and unarmed security services, strategic consulting and
personnel training, and landmine removal, policing, and other tactical support
through direct contracts. 118 The largest U.N. agency clients of PMSCs include
the U.N. Development Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
and the U.N. Procurement Division, which supports peacekeeping missions. 119
In light of these relationships, the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries
has adopted the position that the U.N. should serve as a model for states, and
possibly other organizations, in its contractual use of PMSCs, and has begun
establishing guidance and policy documents to further this goal. 120 In 2012, the
Working Group, together with the U.N. Department on Safety and Security,
published a Security Policy Manual and a Security Management Operations
Manual that were designed to govern the use of armed private security
114

115

116

117
118
119
120

U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to SelfDetermination, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMerc
enariesIndex.aspx (last visited April 25, 2015).
Id.; OHCHR, See Study on the Use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by the United
Nations, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/StudyOnPM
SC.aspx (last visited May 11, 2015).
Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights Shaista Shameen, Report on the Question
of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of
the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/60/263 (Aug. 17, 2005).
See Østensen, supra note 88, at 8.
See Pingeot, supra note 93, at 7, 9, 12–13.
Id. at 45–46.
See OHCHR, Concept Note: Expert Panel Event on the Use of Private Military and Security Companies
(PMSCs) by the United Nations (July 31, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/ExpertPanelConceptNote.pdf [hereinafter Concept Note].
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companies by U.N. agencies. 121 These documents attempt to enhance the U.N.
regulatory framework for PMSC contracting by establishing a coherent policy
regarding selection criteria and screening requirements for security providers and
their personnel, use of force operating procedures, training requirements, and
accountability within the U.N. agency for management and oversight of the
contract. 122 In fact, the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries is “of the
opinion that the U.N. has the opportunity and indeed the responsibility to
positively influence the standards of [the PMSC industry] to comply with
international human rights norms.” 123
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has additionally
expressed its intention to establish more systematic contacts and relationships
with PMSCs operating in humanitarian crisis zones. 124 In 2004, the ICRC
indicated it would encourage private companies to include international
humanitarian law in their training. 125 This further indicates a growing acceptance
on the part of the international community that PMSCs are here to stay and will
continue to play an integral role in the field of humanitarian intervention. Rather
than calling for their prohibition, the U.N. and the ICRC are seeking to reconcile
and to formalize their participation under international law. 126

B. Affirmative Obligations on States to Provide Peacekeepers
While PMSCs are not expressly prohibited under international law, is there
nevertheless an affirmative obligation for U.N. member states to provide
121

122

123

124

125
126

U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), United Nations Security Management System:
Security Policy Manual, Armed Private Security Companies (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/UNSecurityPolicyManual.pdf;
UNDSS,
Security Management Operations Manual, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private
Security Companies (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries
/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmedSecurityServices.pdf; see also UNDSS, Guidelines on
the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies Annex A—Statement of Works (Nov. 8,
2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/Guidelines
AnnexAStatementOfWork.pdf; UNDSS, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private
Security Companies Annex B—Model Contract, UNDSS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GudielinesAnnexBModelContract.pdf.
U.N. Security Management System: Security Policy Manual, supra note 121; Østensen, supra note 88, at
43.
Anton Katz, United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries: The Use of Private
Military Security Companies by the United Nations in Peace Operations (July 31, 2013), summary
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/Event
Summary.pdf.
I.C.R.C.,The I.C.R.C. to Expand Contacts with Private Military and Security Companies (2004), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/63he58.htm.
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See, for example, id.; see Concept Note, supra note 120.
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peacekeeping forces? In other words, would the U.N.’s direct contracting with a
PMSC to create a rapid-reaction force interfere with a requirement or eliminate a
crucial role that states play through providing forces?
The U.N. Charter places on states the obligation to give effect to Security
Council decisions. 127 Under Article 48, actions “required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security shall be taken by all the Members of the U.N. or by some of them, as
the Security Council may determine.” 128 This obligation has resulted in the
current system under which member states contribute the funds, forces,
equipment, and training required to carry out U.N. peacekeeping missions.
It is hard to see how this language requires that states provide support to
peacekeeping in a particular manner, and more specifically, through the
provision of troops. The U.N. Charter does not specify how member states are
to carry out Security Council decisions. 129 Moreover, the Charter does not
mention peacekeeping, much less requirements for troop composition, despite
its widespread acceptance as one of the most critical tools at the Council’s
disposal for achieving its principal responsibility of maintaining international
peace. 130
Some commentators have argued that the process by which U.N. member
states are required to contribute troops, equipment, funds, and other forms of
support to peacekeeping missions adds a crucial layer of democratic
accountability to the way in which international peace and security is
preserved. 131 The U.N. Security Council represents a concentration of authority
in the hands of a few member states. 132 In choosing whether or not to contribute
to the fulfillment of a mandate, TCCs are presented with the opportunity to
exercise some form of a vote through their support, or lack thereof. Indeed,
some countries view contributing to a peacekeeping mission as a critical avenue
through which member states with limited political power within the U.N.

127
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DPKO, Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, available at http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml (last visited April 25, 2015).
U.N. Charter art. 48, para. 1.
Id.
See Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, supra note 127.
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See Stephen Mathias, Regulating and Monitoring Private Military and Security Companies in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, http://www.iihl.org/iihl/
Documents/Mathias.pdf (last visited May 11, 2015); Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations in Global
Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current and Future Challenges (2011),
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system can increase their voice on issues of international security. 133 Article 44 of
the Charter requires the Security Council to include a troop-contributing country
in decisions concerning the deployment of its forces, which underscores the idea
that TCCs are key stakeholders in the peacekeeping process. 134
The proposal to employ PMSCs as rapid-reaction forces, however, does
not remove or limit this layer of accountability in any fundamental way. First,
U.N. member states will still be called on to bear the budgetary costs of
deploying the force regardless of troop makeup. Second, a rapid-reaction force
would be a short-term, comparatively small part of a larger peacekeeping
mission, which will still require troop contributions from member states. Third,
the use of PMSCs does not have to be exclusive. If U.N. member states have
both the capacity and the political will to establish a TCC force capable of rapid
deployment, the Security Council should encourage such an initiative. Using
PMSCs would allow the U.N. to bypass political intransigence, lack of capacity,
or other barriers created by member states reluctant to commit their own troops
to a high-risk environment. It would make available to the U.N. the rapidreaction capabilities that exist in the private sector, a feature that member states
have proven unable, or perhaps unwilling, to provide to U.N. peacekeeping
efforts. 135 The national interest of TCCs may invoke resistance to the
deployment of PMSCs as a rapid-response force, as they may regard the use of
PMSCs in peacekeeping operations as contrary to their own economic interests
if it threatens to replace their contributions to U.N. peacekeeping. 136 However,
the proposal at hand does not view sourcing of U.N. peacekeepers from TCCs
as mutually exclusive from using PMSCs as a temporary rapid-reaction force. In
fact, the deployment of PMSCs as U.N. peacekeepers would not in any way
inhibit TCCs from contributing troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations and
garnering a financial benefit from doing so. The PMSCs would merely constitute
a short-term stop-gap measure for situations requiring a more rapid deployment
than TCCs can manage.
The U.N. has never hired PMSCs to serve in a peacekeeping role, much
less the more robust peace enforcement role of a rapid-reaction force. 137 In
133

134
135

136
137

See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11, at 4, 6 (also noting some states contribute to peacekeeping
because they “see it as a fairer and more preferable alternative to great power hegemony and
provide peacekeepers to support that system.” It is also viewed as a way to strengthen a state’s bid
for a temporary seat on the Security Council. Id. at 4.).
U.N. Charter, supra note 128, art. 44.
See, supra, Section II (discussing the timetable for the DRC Force Intervention Brigade); see also
Bellamy & Williams, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that WEOG countries have specialized
capabilities, but are more likely to work under an ad hoc group or alliance, such as NATO).
See Østensen, supra note 88, at 53.
See id., at 15–17.
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1994, however, the Security Council did consider the possibility, which was met
with some support. 138 The DPKO faced the seemingly insurmountable task of
delivering humanitarian aid to 1.2 million refugees who had fled the Rwandan
genocide into the DRC, then known as Zaire. The location of the refugees
created the risk both that the aid would fall into the wrong hands and that the
mission would prove highly dangerous for a deployed peacekeeping force. To
overcome these challenges, the DPKO proposed that the U.N. employ a PMSC
to help deliver the aid and provide added security. 139
According to confidential interviews with those present at the Security
Council discussions, the proposal ultimately failed to garner the necessary
support. This was not due to any express legal obstacle, but rather to cost
considerations and moral objections. 140 One argument against the measure did
consider the impact on U.N. member state obligations to provide peacekeeping
troops: that “using a private security company to fulfill an international public
responsibility was tantamount to shirking that responsibility.” 141 This refrain has
been echoed more recently by some U.N. officials and experts, who have
expressed concern that, in employing PMSCs as U.N. peacekeepers, the
international community is sending the signal to those in conflict zones “that we
care about you, but not to the point of risking our own boys.” 142 One has to
wonder, though, which should be seen as amounting to the greater abrogation of
responsibility—the use of private contractors instead of TCC forces to ensure
the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, or the failure to provide any aid to over
one million refugees, due to states’ political unwillingness to either contribute
troops or to employ private security companies to do so?
Ultimately, the primary responsibility of the Security Council is to decide
what measures the international community should take to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 143 The use of private contracting firms to
comprise a rapid-reaction force could prove a valuable tool to achieve these
ends. Neither the U.N. Charter and the obligations it places on states, nor the
current system of troop contribution to peacekeeping, should be taken to
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constrain the Security Council’s ability to deploy PMSCs in a timely manner to
protect civilians and prevent conflict escalation.

IV. A CCOUNTABILITY O F A PMSC R APID -R EACTION F ORCE
Many of the persistent criticisms and concerns surrounding the use of
PMSCs stem from a perception that they operate in a legal vacuum, lacking
transparency, democratic oversight, and legal accountability for their actions. 144
Anecdotal and sensational reports of the actions of private contractors hired by
the U.S. to assist military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not help this
perception. Rather, they have entrenched the idea that PMSCs, like mercenaries,
are free to violate human rights and international humanitarian legal norms with
impunity. 145
In reality, however, the extent of accountability for the actions of PMSCs
depends on who is employing them, as well as the terms of the legal and
contractual structure under which they are employed. 146 Contrary to public
perception, PMSCs generally operate under a complex system of international
and domestic legal provisions, codified through contract. 147 This Section explains
that the U.N. could hold PMSCs to a substantially higher level of accountability
than the level to which U.N. peacekeepers are currently held if it establishes a
robust licensing system, clearly articulates a contractual relationship and
operational mandate, and ensures that PMSCs can be held criminally or civilly
liable for bad acts. This Section explains the basic elements necessary for an
effective regulatory scheme, but it does not attempt to provide a model contract.
Instead, it offers a sketch of an area that is ripe for further research and
development.
As a preliminary matter, the perception that PMSCs on the whole behave
in a worse manner than state troops is not entirely warranted. Studies have
shown that in some instances private military and security companies have
demonstrated a higher respect for human rights and humanitarian law than
national armies or peacekeeping forces, 148 and that “what worries the
international community enough to shy away from utilizing PMCs is the potential
144
145
146
147

148

See Percy, supra note 93, at 11–28.
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harm that they could do, not any particular past incident.” 149 To illustrate this
point, many commentators have pointed to the actions of the private South
Africa-based Executive Outcomes (EO, no longer in operation) in Sierra Leone
during the 1991–2002 civil war. The PMSC’s presence in the field “appear[ed] to
bring with it elements of military professionalism and international values . . . .
Compared with the [Sierra Leone Armed Forces], the [Revolutionary United
Front rebels], and the militias, EO’s record looks stellar.” 150
A related example can be found in neighboring Liberia. To combat a legacy
of gross and widespread human rights violations committed by the Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL) during the country’s 1999–2003 civil war, it was agreed
that the AFL would be completely dissolved and a new army created. 151 To
accomplish this monumental task, the U.S.—intimately involved in Liberia’s
post-conflict reconstruction—contracted with PMSCs DynCorp and PAE to
build the necessary physical infrastructure and conduct the complete
demobilization, recruitment, vetting, training, and professionalization required to
establish a new AFL. 152 To specifically address the legacy of AFL abuses,
DynCorp designed a human rights vetting approach based on international best
practices and human rights norms, which was integrated into the broader vetting
and training process. 153 This transformation, facilitated by the innovation and
expertise of PMSCs, was labeled “a notable success—the best, several experts
said, they had witnessed anywhere in the world.” 154 While this example
represents a success in the training and vetting abilities of a private company and
not directly its conduct on the ground, it serves to demonstrate that PMSCs
have the capacity to establish mechanisms to ensure adherence to international
human rights norms. Indeed, the task of designing and implementing a
comprehensive vetting and training program was ultimately delegated to a
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private company because neither the U.N. nor the U.S. had the system or
capabilities in place to conduct it themselves. 155
Furthermore, many of the risks potentially present when a state contracts
with a PMSC may not exist under a contract with the U.N. or another
international or regional body. The U.K. Green Paper, a widely cited resource on
the topic of regulating the use of private military companies (PMCs), is highly
optimistic on this point, arguing that
[m]any of the problems that arise when a sovereign government employs a
PMC would not apply if it were contracted to the U.N. . . . It would not for
example be a threat to sovereignty or stability; and the question of
exploitation of raw material resources would not arise. 156

The paper further posits that “[t]here would also be no difficulty in monitoring
the performance and behavior of a PMC employed by the U.N.” 157
This final position, however, fails to recognize the current challenges the
U.N. faces in monitoring PMSCs. The current contractual regime governing the
U.N.’s use of PMSCs is highly opaque, and thus not well understood. 158 The
U.N. Department of Safety and Security has conceded it cannot provide
accurate estimates on the number of U.N. private security contracts. 159 While
little information about the nature, scope, and parties to the contracts is made
public, PMSCs appear to be hired on a largely ad hoc basis, with little formalized
or system-wide consultation. 160 The remainder of this Article therefore describes
the elements that would be necessary for an effective regulatory scheme of
PMSCs by the U.N.

A. Licensing Stringent Standards of Conduct
The U.N. currently maintains a selection process by which private
companies are licensed as U.N. Secretariat Registered Vendors, eligible to
contract with U.N. bodies. 161 This process eliminates from consideration
companies that are subject to U.N. sanctions, have been suspended, or are under
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formal investigation for engaging in unethical practices. 162 In addition, it requires
vendors to ratify a U.N. Supplier Code of Conduct, which mandates adherence
to the values enshrined in the U.N. Charter including “respect for fundamental
human rights, social justice and human dignity,” as well as to international labor
standards, principles of non-discrimination, and baseline industry standards. 163
Qualified vendors must also screen personnel for criminal convictions, including
for any breach of international criminal or humanitarian law and provide regular
relevant training to its personnel, for example with respect to the International
Code of Conduct, the Use of Force Policy, weapons training and management,
human rights law and application. 164 Under the current licensing system, many
PMSCs including Saracen Uganda, Hart Security, PAE, Aegis Defense Services,
G4S, and Academi (successor company to Blackwater), have been established as
certified vendors of security services, training, landmine removal initiatives, and
policing. 165
Given the unique levels of authority that would be granted a rapid-reaction
force, as well as the impact of its conduct on the perceived credibility and
competence of U.N. peacekeeping, companies eligible for providing rapidreaction capabilities must be held to a higher standard than is currently required.
In addition to the existing code of conduct, PMSCs should be required to adhere
to a peacekeeping-specific code, mandating demonstrated levels of
professionalism, competence, accountability, and adherence to existing human
rights norms and humanitarian legal principles. Those PMSCs that fail to adhere
to these standards would be prohibited from contracting with the U.N. as
peacekeepers. Thus, under this model, only PMSCs that strictly adhere to all
relevant international laws and protocols in regards to human rights and take
every practicable measure to minimize loss of life and destruction of property
would be contracted by the U.N. as part of a rapid reaction force.
With respect to the use of force, the U.N. should require PMSCs
contracted as a rapid-response force
to develop a ‘use of force policy’ appropriate for the conditions where it is
required to operate. The policy must be consistent with the applicable local
laws and to the extent possible, consistent with the “use of force policy” of
[the U.N.]. In this regard, [the PMSC’s] use of force policy [should] be at
162
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least as restrictive (and more restrictive if required by local laws) as [the
U.N.’s] use of force policy. The UN’s use of force policy is quite restrictive.
And the use of force by a UN security officer must be reasonable and
proportional to the threat and the minimum required to negate that threat.
The officer must also determine that the force is necessary, under the
circumstances known at that time, to negate that threat and that there is no
other reasonable alternative. Use of deadly force may only be used for self
defence or to protect other persons against imminent threat of harm. 166

That a PMSC would be willing to adhere to such a code of conduct and
demonstrate adherence to it is not wishful thinking. Such conduct regimes
governing PMSCs already exist. The most widely supported of these is the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC),
developed by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in 2010. 167 By
2013, more than 700 companies had become signatories. 168 The purpose of the
ICoC is to establish commonly agreed upon principles governing the conduct of
PMSCs in contexts where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, and
to create a foundation to establish governance and oversight mechanisms. 169
Signatory companies are bound to adhere to various commitments, including: to
respect human rights, humanitarian law, and all applicable national laws; to not
contract with governments or other entities contrary to U.N. Security Council
sanctions; and to avoid benefitting from national or international crimes and
ensure the services they provide are not used to perpetrate crimes. 170 In addition,
PMSCs are required to incorporate the Code into their company policies and
internal control and compliance systems, vet and train personnel and
subcontractors to specified levels, and establish grievance procedures to address
claims of ICoC noncompliance. 171 The ICoC grew out of the Montreux
166
167

See Mathias, supra note 131, at 6.
Int’l
Code
of
Conduct
for
Private
Security
Service
Providers
(ICoC),
http://web.archive.org/web/20150315001313/http://www.icoc-psp.org/ (last visited May 12,
2015) [hereinafter ICoC].

168

See Scott Jerbi, Academy Briefing No. 4, The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 3 (Aug. 2013),
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/briefing4_web_final.pdf. For a full list of
companies, see Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC): Signatory Companies,
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-humanrights.org/en/intl-codeof-conduct-for-private-security-service-providers-icoc-signatory-companies (last visited Nov. 2,
2015). As of Nov. 3, 2015, the ICoC website, http://www.icoca.ch, listed 87 companies in its
signatory list. This contraction is likely due to the fact that the website is new and the content is
still being populated, rather than attrition of signatories. Older versions of the website, accessed
through https://archive.org/web/, contain the full list.

169

ICoC, supra note 167, at ¶ 5–8. See also ICoC Mandate, available at http://icoca.ch/en/mandate.
ICoC, supra note 167, at ¶¶ 16–27.

170
171

Id. ¶¶ 44–55.
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Document initiative, an effort undertaken by Switzerland and the ICRC in 2008,
which establishes principles and good practices for governments that serve as
home, contracting, or territorial states to private companies. 172
The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) represents a
similar initiative. ISOA is an industry-initiated voluntary membership
organization, open to private sector companies that operate “in conflict and
post-conflict environments and provide disaster relief.” 173 To be eligible for
membership, companies must sign on to the organization’s code of conduct,
designed to ensure that its members “contribute their valuable services for the
benefit of international peace and human security.” 174 It requires adherence to all
pertinent mandatory and voluntary rules of international humanitarian and
human rights law, including the ICoC. 175 Additionally, it includes requirements
of specific relevance to engaging in combat operations, including transparency
and accountability in all operations, the establishment of appropriate rules for
the use of force in consultation with the client, the accounting of all weapons
during engagement, and prohibitions on the illegal use of weapons. 176
In creating a preliminary PMSC licensing structure, the U.N. should
consider either formally adopting an existing mechanism such as the ICoC or
ISOA code, or using these as models from which to build a code governing
rapid-reaction force contributors. Both these mechanisms articulate higher
standards of conduct than those required under the existing vendor registration
system, but simultaneously build on fundamental principles and norms espoused
in the U.N. Charter, Geneva Conventions, and Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 177 Furthermore, the private military and security industry has already
shown itself amenable to adhering to the requirements they establish. The
Montreux Document further adds the support of 52 countries to the ICoC
system and establishes a mechanism through which other U.N. member states
could adopt it as well. 178

172

173

174
175
176
177
178

See The Montreux Document, SWISS FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FDFA), available at
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/internationalhumanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html (last visited May
12, 2015).
ISOA Code of Conduct, INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASS’N., available at http://www.stabilityoperations.org/?page=Code (last visited May 11, 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See
Participating
States
of
the
Montreux
Document,
FDFA,
available
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-
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B. Contracting for Accountability
The initial licensing process would establish baseline requirements to be
met before a PMSC was eligible to acquire a contract with the U.N. to provide
rapid-reaction services. The subsequent contract for services would establish the
primary accountability framework. It would formalize the provisions of the code
of conduct, conditioning the relationship on adherence and translating its norms
into contractual, legally enforceable obligations.
The contract would additionally articulate concrete parameters, constraints,
and liability under which the force would operate. It would place an express
ceiling on the degree of force that could be employed by PMSC troops. 179 It
would establish the duration of the initial engagement and contain conditions
under which the mandate could be extended, renewed, or terminated. 180 It could
mandate reporting and transparency requirements, establishing formal channels
of communication between the on-the-ground force, the DPKO, and the
Security Council. 181 And in the event of a failure to adhere to the requirements
of the contract or human rights or international humanitarian law on the part of
PMSC personnel, the contract could contain provisions articulating individual
and company liability and jurisdiction over violations, including forum selection
and choice of law provisions. 182 Under the contract, irrespective of their status
or assignment, “private contractors [could] be held responsible for war crimes
and other violations of international humanitarian law they may commit.” 183 The
fact that PMSCs contracted to provide a rapid-reaction force would “carry
weapons and may be de facto placed in situations where they can exercise some
form [of] authority are additional reasons to insist on their obligations under
humanitarian law.” 184
The Security Policy Manual and Security Management Operations Manual,
produced by the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries and the U.N.
Department of Safety and Security, could be used to help inform the creation of

179

180
181
182
183
184

humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html (last visited April
26, 2015).
See, for example, S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 53. Chapter VII, under which more robust peacekeeping
forces are mandated, does not expressly address peacekeeping; interpreting its spirit and meaning
has given rise to disagreement about whether mandates establish a ceiling or a floor on the use of
force. See Cammaert, supra note 5, at 7. These types of uncertainties would need to be completely
eliminated from a U.N. contractual relationship with PMSCs.
See Diskenson, supra note 147, at 217–28.
See id. at 23–24.
Kotarski & Walker, supra note 138, at 257–59.
See Faite, supra note 95, at 14.
Id.
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a model contract for a PMSC rapid-reaction force. The U.N. could also look to
the U.S.-U.K. Voluntary Principles and the U.N. Business Norms. 185 The
Security Management Operations Manual already contains a model contract for
private security services, identifies elements of a successful contractor proposal,
and establishes baseline technical requirements of equipment provision,
subcontracting, communications and reporting, training, and performance
evaluations. 186 This system would require substantive expansion, however, or the
creation of a supplemental, parallel system to accommodate the actions required
of a rapid-reaction force. The manuals at present expressly limit U.N. agencies to
contracting with private companies for static physical protection only, restricting
companies to primarily performing basic monitoring and search functions. 187
In addition to a formal contract, a PMSC-comprised rapid-reaction force
would need to operate under a Security Council mandate. Because the specifics
of a contract would likely not be public, a mandate would require regular
reporting and provide a layer of accountability through transparency into the
operations of the force, making the general contours of the contract public by
articulating its goals, authorized force levels, and mission duration. 188
Some critics have expressed concern that PMSCs, as private entities
designed to profit from participation in conflict, would have no incentive to
bring a conflict to an end. 189 The establishment of both a short-term contract
with clearly delineated responsibilities and a public mandate governing their
actions and accountability would constrain this risk. The failure to meet the
articulated goals of the mandate and contract, or achieve measurable progress
towards their realization, would result in the termination of a mandate or failure
to renew it. PMSCs that exhibit persistent failures to meet their obligations or
185

See supra Section II(a); Østensen, supra note 88; see generally OHCHR, Study on the Use of Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by the United Nations, supra note 115.

186

Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies Annex A—Statement of
Works, supra note 121; Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies
Annex B—Model Contract, supra note 121. This system also requires that a company’s Use of Force
Policy, developed in pursuance of the system, comport with the ICoC. See United Nations Security
Management System: Security Policy Manual, Armed Private Security Companies, supra note 121, ¶ 24(a); see
Security Management Operations Manual, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private
Security Companies, supra note 121, ¶ 34; James Cockayne, Commercial Security in Humanitarian and
Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study, INT’L PEACE ACAD., 20 (Mar. 2006),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Cockayne__Commercial_security_in_humanitarian_
and_post-conflict_settings.pdf.

187

Security Management Operations Manual, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private
Security Companies, supra note 121, at Section C: “Services which may be contracted from an Armed
Private Security Company”, ¶¶ 7–13.
See, for example, S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 53.

188
189

See U.K. Green Paper, supra note 101, ¶ 43.
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adhere to the prescribed code of conduct would additionally lose their status as
U.N.-licensed vendors and thus the potential for future contracts. 190

C. Civil and Criminal Liability
Within a robust contractual system, the U.N. would also need to ensure
that adequate avenues for redress exist in the event of crimes committed by a
Security Council-mandated and DPKO overseen rapid-reaction force. If such a
force were made up of PMSCs, despite its private makeup, the rapid-reaction
force would be a contractor of the U.N. The legitimacy of the mission’s work,
and the work of U.N. peacekeeping more generally, depends on the confidence
it inspires. Nothing destroys this confidence more than real or perceived
impunity for violations committed by its personnel. 191 Thus, PMSCs would need
to be held to a higher degree of accountability than that to which traditional
peacekeepers are held. Such standards would assist in curing the negative
perceptions that persist about the legal responsiveness of private military actors.
Fortunately, such heightened accountability is actually much easier to achieve
with private actors than with traditional peacekeepers.
Peacekeepers are traditionally granted a high degree of jurisdictional
immunity from the laws of the host state by a number of international and
bilateral agreements and U.N. policies. 192 This immunity is codified in a Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFA) drawn up between the U.N., the TCC, and the
country hosting the peacekeeping mission. 193 The U.N. model SOFA extends
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. to the operation,
its property, and its members, and establishes immunities unique to
peacekeeping personnel. 194 All personnel enjoy complete immunity for actions

190
191

192

193

194

See id.
See U.N. General Assembly, Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials, Experts on Mission
Critical to Organization’s Credibility, Legal Committee Stresses in Debate (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3485.doc.htm; see also Andrew Ladley, Peacekeeper Abuse,
Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability in International Peace
Operations, in POLITICS AND ETHICS REVIEW 81, 82 (2005) (describing the effects of allegations of
rape and other abuses by peacekeepers on the perceived integrity and legitimacy of the mission).
See generally Róisín Burke, Status of Forces Deployed on U.N. Peacekeeping Operations:
Jurisdictional Immunity, in J. CONFL. & SEC. L. 1–42 (2011).
Id.; see also Micaela Frulli, Immunity for Private Military Contractors: Legal Hurdles or Political Snags?, in
WAR BY CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 448,
448 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2011).
U.N. Secretary General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All
Their Aspects: U.N. Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, ¶¶ 4–5, U.N. Doc.
A/45/594, 1990, http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup09/basicmats/UNsofa.pdf.

474

Vol. 16 No. 2

Contracting for Stability

Genser

performed in their official capacity. 195 In addition, the model SOFA holds that
“[m]ilitary members of the military component of a U.N. peacekeeping mission
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating
states in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them.” 196
The power to effect an arrest of a peacekeeper rests exclusively with the military
police belonging to the U.N. peacekeeping operation, 197 and the host
government is responsible for turning over any allegations and evidence of an
offense to the U.N. force commander. 198 The U.N. is additionally authorized to
administratively discipline peacekeepers, and to discharge them back to their
origin states. 199
In sum, individual peacekeepers are essentially immune from suit. Due to
highly-limited political will by TCCs, actual accountability is rare. 200 Furthermore,
the U.N. mission as a whole enjoys complete legal immunity, a feature only the
U.N. itself can waive. 201 This complex, multi-layered structure of immunities is
well entrenched, supported by the customary international principle of
reciprocity among states and more than 70 years of U.N. and state practice. 202
However, the immunities afforded to private contractors—or their liability
in the absence of such immunity—is determined exclusively by contract. 203
According to the ICRC, the civil liability of a PMSC has been generally accepted
in most countries. 204 This means the company itself could potentially be sued in
a host state for monetary damages in the event of a crime committed by one of
its employees. 205 This is a higher level of accountability than that currently
governing the conduct of peacekeepers, and would incentivize PMSCs to avoid
liability by putting the necessary mechanisms in place to ensure their employees

195

Id. ¶ 46.

196

Id. ¶ 47(b).
Id. ¶ 41.

197
198
199
200
201

202

Id. ¶ 47.
See Burke, supra note 192.
Id. at 64; see also Ladley, supra note 191, at 83.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. II, section 2, Feb. 13,
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
Burke, supra note 192, at 77.

203

See Frulli, supra note 193, at 448. Frulli notes, however, that immunity has been granted to private
contractors through SOFAs or provisional agreements, such as the Iraqi Coalition Provisional
Authority Order 17, issued by the U.S. State Department in 2004, which was interpreted as
granting blanket immunity from Iraqi legal processes. Id at 455–56.

204

I.C.R.C., The I.C.R.C. to Expand Contacts with Private Military and Security Companies (Apr. 8, 2004),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/63he58.htm.
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Id.
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do not commit crimes. 206 In addition, the civil liability of a PMSC as a corporate
entity would allow for an increased possibility of redress for any crimes
committed by guaranteeing a defendant with the monetary resources to cover
damages. 207
Criminal liability of PMSCs, on the other hand, has traditionally been more
limited in most countries. As a consequence, criminal accountability would most
readily rest on prosecuting the individual responsible. 208 Identifying liability, and
establishing which countries or courts maintain jurisdiction, rests in the
contracting arrangement. Even if some form of limited immunity is provided for
contractors for acts committed pursuant to their U.N. mandate, a contract
should state, as a minimum standard, that such immunity does not cover any
acts exceeding that authority, including breaches of international humanitarian
law or violations of human rights. 209
Prior to deploying a PMSC rapid-reaction force, the U.N. would still
negotiate a SOFA with the host country. A new style of SOFA designed to
provide enhanced accountability for rapid-reaction forces would need to be
developed. The ICoC and Montreux Document began to formulate an
alternative, suggesting that either the host country or an international tribunal
should be empowered to pursue prosecutions in the case of a crime or violation
of international law, as contracting states have already done. 210 What is crucial is
that the PMSC’s liabilities are clearly determined in the contract negotiations
with the U.N. At a minimum, members of a rapid-reaction force should be
subject to the jurisdiction of the host country, the country in which they are
incorporated, and/or an agreed-upon binding arbitration mechanism for
breaches or crimes falling outside contractually approved actions. 211 This system
206

207
208
209

210

211

The ICoC requires signatory companies to establish grievance procedures to address claims
alleging failure by company personnel to uphold any of the principles contained in the Code. The
Code further establishes baseline requirements that the procedure be fair, accessible, and that the
company offer effective remedies; that the details of the grievance system be made public; that
investigations be conducted promptly and impartially; and other guarantees of adequate redress.
The ICoC notes that this is in addition to, and does not replace, additional contractual
requirements to which the companies might be subject. ICoC, supra note 167, ¶¶ 66–68.
Kotarski & Walker, supra note 138, at 257–59.
The I.C.R.C. to Expand Contacts with Private Military and Security Companies, supra note 204.
See Frulli, supra note 193, at 455–60 (describing the contours of what immunity for private
contractors might cover in compliance with international law).
Montreux Document, supra note 172; see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan: Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 10 (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf; also see, ICoC, supra note 167.
See Frulli, supra note 193, at 456 (suggesting that violations of the laws of the host state apparently
committed under the auspices of an official act should be carefully scrutinized to determine
elements that might amount to an abuse of authority, thus permitting prosecution).
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of liability would allow host countries to hold PMSCs accountable for legal
violations committed by their agents within the country’s jurisdictional
borders. 212 Where appropriate, command responsibility should extend liability
for serious crimes committed by private security personnel to their superiors. 213
In addition, PMSCs should be subject to civil liability and made responsible for
misconduct by their employees. 214 It is important to note that any PMSC hired
to become a rapid-reaction force would, by contract, not enjoy the full immunity
of the U.N.
Some critics have raised concerns that the U.N. risks undermining its
image and credibility if it contracts with PMSCs to form a rapid-response
force. 215 In general, PMSCs contracted by the U.N. as peacekeepers would be
identically situated in that they would be held accountable for violations of
international humanitarian law committed pursuant to their U.N. mandate.
Unlike current peacekeepers, however, who can only be prosecuted as
individuals, PMSCs, as companies established in a particular country, could
additionally be prosecuted for actions that violate the laws of the country in
which they operate or are incorporated. By giving preference to PMSCs with
significant assets or those incorporated in foreign jurisdictions with effective
regimes regulating extra-territorial commercial security provisions, the U.N. can
assure that PMSCs could be prosecuted appropriately. 216 Therefore, the
proposed model of a rapid-response force composed of PMSCs would in fact
add an additional layer of accountability to U.N. peacekeepers.
PMSCs, as forces contracted by the U.N., would of course be subject to
the human rights obligations of the U.N. and therefore liable for violations of
international law, including international humanitarian law, as the U.N. itself is a
subject of international law. 217 As a preliminary matter, one might contest
whether international humanitarian law is applicable to the U.N. at all. 218 This
question “was confronted to some extent during early U.N. operations, such as
in Korea. The ICJ has considered the U.N. to be ‘a subject of international law
and capable of possessing international rights and duties.’” 219 This refers to all
212

See Faite, supra note 95, at 11.

213

See Elsea, supra note 210, at 10.
Kotarski & Walker, supra note 138, at 257–58.

214
215
216
217
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See Mathias, supra note 131, at 5.
See Cockayne, supra note 186, at 19–20.
See Matija Kovac, Legal Issues Arising from the Possible Inclusion of Private Military Security
Companies in U.N. Peacekeeping, in 2009 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. VOLUME 13, 307–374 (A.
von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum eds.).
See Janaby, supra note 19, at 88.
Id.
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the rules of international law, including international humanitarian law. Respect
for international humanitarian law by U.N. forces is also mandated by the SOFA
agreement entered into between the U.N. and the State receiving a peacekeeping
mission. Both the Secretary General’s Bulletin on Observance by U.N. Forces of
International Humanitarian Law and the Report of the Panel on the U.N. Peace
Operations declare that international humanitarian law applies to U.N. forces,
and accordingly to PMSCs contracted by the U.N. as a rapid-reaction force. 220
It is important to recall that the DPKO is funded by the contributions of
U.N. members, and therefore their demands on the U.N. to account for the
effective use of their resources will provide an additional level of accountability
for PMSCs. Existing mechanisms may already provide the basis for such action
by donor states, for example through the European Commission Humanitarian
Office Framework Partnership Agreement. 221 Long-term, donor-driven
oversight of PMSCs may include: donor-maintained registries of PMSCs and
their performance; baseline security standards; and encouraging the U.N. to
reward socially responsible PMSCs through preferential treatment. 222 For their
part, PMSCs have acknowledged their industry’s negative association with
mercenaries and recognized that they must self-regulate to gain credibility in the
eyes of the public at large. 223

D. Market Accountability:
for Business

Making

Human

Rights

Good

Heightened levels of accountability built into contracts will increase a
PMSC’s risk exposure. As a consequence, the greater the accountability, the
more expensive the rapid-reaction force is likely to be for U.N. member states to
fund. However, the costs saved by the U.N. in gaining the capacity to respond in
a more timely manner to emerging conflicts—and to hold off on deploying the
more costly and robust peacekeeping mission—should not be discounted. While
the U.N. currently reimburses TCCs at a rate of $1,332 per person per month,
the actual costs of traditional peacekeeping missions are much higher, as they
include substantial additional costs for things like equipment and
infrastructure. 224 In a U.S. Senate appropriations bill regarding U.S. contributions
to international peacekeeping activities, the Committee found that in many cases,
PMSCs “can carry out effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the
220
221
222
223
224

Id.
See Cockayne, supra note 186, at iii.
Id.
Id.
S.C. Res. 68/281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/281 (June 30, 2014).
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funding the U.N. requires to carry out the same missions” and concluded that
“the United Nations can no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings
that private companies with proven records of good service and good behavior
can offer.” 225 While the U.N. will have to independently investigate these
potential cost-savings and determine the value of having a privately-contracted
rapid-reaction force—including the value of preventing a difficult situation from
becoming much worse—the U.N.’s previous decisions to contract with PMSCs
bode well for the current proposal.
Turning to the market to provide peacekeepers for a rapid-reaction force
has the potential to reduce administrative, training, and insurance costs and the
replacement costs from peacekeeper turnover and relocation. 226 Further, marketbased solutions to the U.N.’s peacekeeping challenges are seen as “more flexible
and efficient, and are considered to reduce exposure to liability.” 227 As one
senior UNHCR official expressed, “[i]f you can find a qualified contractor, that
really does save you a lot of time and effort . . . plus then they don’t become UN
employees,” which would imply responsibilities related to protection of
employees, benefits, hiring and firing, tenure, and retirement contributions. 228
Furthermore, it is hard to place a monetary value on the civilian lives that
could potentially be saved through the more rapid deployment of forces. There
are likely to be secondary long-term benefits within the private military
contracting market as well. If the U.N. were to become one of the “super
clients” of the private security industry, eventually there would be an overall
skew in the market towards standards of conduct that comport to international
human rights and humanitarian legal norms, which would marginalize
disreputable PMSCs. 229 By contracting with private companies for peacekeeping
purposes, not only could the U.N. cure some of the persistent challenges of
peacekeeping by establishing rapid-reaction capabilities, it could make human
rights a better business practice. 230
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See Østensen, supra note 88, at 52.
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See Cockayne, supra note 186, at 5.
Id.

227
228
229
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Id.
See U.K. Green Paper, supra note 101, ¶ 45; see AVANT, supra note 103, at 53 (arguing that by giving
PMSCs a legitimate role as military professionals, the U.N. and other clients can help ensure that
they operate according to international values).
This would require the U.N. to ensure the contracts are awarded competitively. In analyzing the
policy prospects for regulating PMSCs, Eugenio Cusumano notes that many major contracts are
awarded to PMSCs non-competitively; in order for public demand to contribute to the regulation
of company conduct, the market should be open. Eugenio Cusumano, Policy Prospects for Regulating
Private Military and Security Companies, in WAR BY CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN
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V. C ONCLUSION
In October 2014, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop of Mali asked the
Security Council to take “urgent measures” and deploy a rapid-reaction force on
top of the current U.N. peacekeeping mission. 231 Not only were countless
civilians being killed, he explained, but the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had been subject to some of the
deadliest violence targeting a U.N. peacekeeping mission in history—at the time
of the request, 31 peacekeepers had been killed and 66 injured since
MINUSMA’s establishment in July 2013. 232 A rapid-reaction force with more
robust rules of engagement, Foreign Minister Diop argued, would help stem the
upsurge in violence and enable MINUSMA to focus on restarting the stalled
peace talks. 233 Despite this request, however, the Security Council took no
action. When MINUSMA’s mandate was renewed in June 2015, the levels of
peacekeepers and police were kept at the same levels as those mandated in June
2014. 234
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General reported “the security situation remained
extremely volatile,” and that “extremist and asymmetric attacks as well as
criminal threats against the Malian defence and security forces and MINUSMA
persisted throughout the reporting period, and have spread to formerly safer
regions . . . .” 235 The total number of peacekeepers killed has almost doubled to
56. 236 The Secretary-General added that civilians faced “[a]rmed banditry,
intercommunal violence, indiscriminate attacks by extremist groups and
retaliation from armed groups due to suspected support to the opposite
group.” 237 And although the inter-Malian peace talks culminated in the signing of
a peace and reconciliation agreement in June 2015, the Secretary-General noted
“the magnitude of the challenges and risks of reversals should not be
underestimated,” the “security situation . . . remain[s] alarming,” and “[t]he gross
LAW, AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 11, 21–23 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti eds.,
2011).
231
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See id.
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human rights violations that continue to be committed throughout Mali are
unacceptable.” 238
Yet despite these collective observations, which mirrored the concerns
expressed by Foreign Minister Diop a year earlier, the Secretary-General still did
not recommend adding a temporary rapid-reaction force or changing
MINUSMA’s mandate to provide an offensive capability to peacekeepers. The
violent conflict in Mali further demonstrates that the U.N. and its member states
need to develop the political will to create and then deploy a rapid-reaction force
in the first place. Although the Ramos-Horta Report makes clear “a more
reliable system for responding quickly to save lives and arrest emerging conflicts
can potentially avoid a larger, more costly response later,” this has not yet
proven to be a sufficiently persuasive argument for the Security Council to take
action. 239
The world may well be growing more peaceful. Nonetheless, there remains
a pressing need for the U.N. to be able to respond to threats to international
peace and security, and to do so in a robust and timely manner. As the U.N.
considers options for developing a more reliable system for acting quickly in
emerging conflicts, it could evaluate the prospective use of PMSCs as a source
of rapid-reaction force capabilities.
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